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NOTES AND COMMENT
after the law day. Since an assignment does not lessen the obliga-
tions of the assignor, to be logical, he should continue to be held
after assigning. The reasonableness of the time which has been
granted would govern in each case. There is no analogy here to the
rule of suretyship which releases the surety from his obligation
when he has not assented to an extension of time; 18 or to the prin-
ciple of the law of mortgages which releases the grantee of real
property from liability on the mortgage debt where an extension of
time is given without his consent to his grantee who has assumed the
obligation of the mortgage. 9 Where an assignor of a contract to
convey real property is held liable to perform within a reasonable
time after assigning, no new obligations are thrust upon him. But
to hold a surety liable after an extension of time would be, in effect,
to bind him with an obligation to which he never assented. In the
latter case, time is definitely of the essence; it is in fact controlling.
In the case of the vendor of real property, the decree of the court of
equity granting specific performance to one who has been in default
on the law day proceeds of necessity on the theory that time is not
of the essence.
THOMiAS E. McDADE.
JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS oF SECTION 374a CIVIL PRACTICE ACT.
The marked dissension which followed the recent decisions of
two departments of the Appellate Division in interpreting the new
Section 374a of the Civil Practice Act 1 may be attributed to a firm
conviction on the part of many that the broad, beneficial effect in-
tended by the Legislature in enacting this amendment to the statute
was not carried out by the appellate courts in the view which they
took towards the legislative intent as expressed by the wording of
" Drucker v. Rapp, 67 N. Y. 464 (1876).
" Calvo v. Davies, 73 N. Y. 211, 29 Amer. Rep. 130 (1878) ; Union Stores
v. Caswell, 48 Kan. 689, 29 Pac. 1072, 16 L. R. A. 85 (1892).
'L. 1928, Ch. 532:
"ADMISSmILITY OF CERTAIN WRITTEN REcoRDs. Any writing or rec-
ord, whether in the form of an entry in a book or otherwise, made as a
memorandum or record of any act, transaction, occurrence or event, shall
be admissible in evidence in proof of said act, transaction, occurrence or
event, if the trial Judge shall find that it was made in the regular course
of any business, and that it was the regular course of such business to
make such memorandum or record at the time of such act, transaction,
occurrence or event, or .within a reasonable time thereafter. All other
circumstances of the making of such writing or record, including lack
of personal knowledge by the entrant or maker, may be shown to affect
its weight, but they shall not affect its admissibility. The term business
shall include business, profession, occupation and calling of every kind."
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the new law. In Johnson v. Lutz, 2 decided by the Appellate Division
in the Second Department, and in Needle v. N. Y. R. R. Co.,3
in the First Department, situations were presented which were prac-
tically identical. In both cases it was attempted to introduce in
evidence a policeman's report of the accident filed by him in the
station house, it being urged that such evidence was admissible under
the new amendment to the Civil Practice Act.4 In each it was held
that such evidence was inadmissible because the report of the police-
man was based on the statements made to him by others, alleged wit-
nesses to the event, the policeman himself having been absent when
the accident occurred.
In reversing the decision of the trial court which admitted the
questionable evidence in Needle v. N. Y. R. R. Co.,5 the Court said:
"This section was enacted in order to do away with the
archaic rules of procedure in relation to book entries. * * * It
is to be noted, however, that in every case where the section
applies, the fact must be found by the trial Judge that the
entry 'was made in the regular course of any business.' In
the case at bar, to show that this record is not admissible, it is
only necessary to point out that the statements made to the
policeman, upon which he based his report, were not made by
any person in the regular course of any business, but, on the
contrary, the report of the policeman was made upon the
irresponsible gossip of bystanders. * * *"
However just the criticism of this view may be, the result
reached by the Appellate Division has been upheld by the Court of
Appeals which recently affirmed the decision in the Johnson case.6
Speaking for the unanimous court, Judge Hubbs said that in view of
the history of the new legislation it was clear that it was never in-
tended to apply to a situation like that presented in the case at bar.
The confusion regarding this statute centers about the provision
that the lack of personal knowledge by the entrant or maker shall
not affect admission. This apparently invites the conclusion that
any report, though founded on pure hearsay, will be admissible in
evidence. Applying such a construction to the facts of the Johnson
case, it is indeed difficult to reconcile it with the statute. Concededly,
it is the duty of a policeman to report all accidents which occur on
his beat while he is on duty. He made the report in the regular
course of his business at a time nearly contemporaneous with the
event, seemingly, perhaps, all that was required to make the evidence
2226 App. Div. 772, 234 N. Y. Supp. 328, aff'd 253 N. Y. 124 (1930).
a227 App. Div. 276, 237 N. Y. Supp. 547 (1st Dept. 1929).
'Supra Note 1.
5 Supra Note 3.
0 Supra Note 2.
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admissible. Further, the fact that it was not based upon personaz
knowledge should affect merely the weight of the evidence, and not
its admissibility.
It will be profitable at this point for a clearer understanding of
the purpose and scope of the new section,7 to consider the exigencies
which gave rise to its adoption.
Introduced into the United States during the early part of the
nineteenth century, at a time when self-made evidence was still re-
garded with suspicion, the book entry rule applied at first only to
cases where the entrant was unavailable as a witness.8 Obviously,
since the entries were substituted for the oral testimony of the wit-
ness, personal knowledge by the entrant was required. Later de-
cisions modified the rule so as to regard these entries as independent
evidence. 9 The common law rule is clearly expressed in the leading
case of Mayor v. Second Avenue R. R.10 In an action to recover
for the amount of work performed and material used to make certain
repairs, the plaintiff offered in evidence a time book and a written
account of material kept by the head foreman. With respect to the
time book the head foreman testified that the entries therein were
correctly made by him upon the report to him of the facts by two
gang foremen. The two gang foremen, in turn, testified they had
never seen the entries, but that they were in charge of the laborers
and that they had correctly reported to the head foremen each day
the names of the men who worked and the number of hours which
each man had worked. This chain of testimony was held sufficient
foundation for the admission of the time book in evidence. With
respect to the account of material, however, it appeared that a part
of the items were furnished to the head foreman by one of the two
gang foremen, who testified that he had no personal knowledge of
the amount of stone which had been delivered, but that he had ac-
cepted the count of the carman and that his reports to the head fore-
man was based upon the reports of the carman to him. The Court
of Appeals pointed- out that, as the carman was not called to testify,
the testimony of the head foreman and the gang foreman with respect
to these items were mere hearsay and, therefore, this portion of the
account of material was not strictly admissible.
The absurdity of this situation can readily be seen. It entailed
a long, tedious, and practically impossible procedure of bringing into
court all the clerks, salesmen, foremen, gangmen, laborers, truckmen,
or whoever else contributed to the making of an entry, to verify it.
Under modern complex business conditions such procedure was
intolerable. In the course of any ordinary business establishment
employees changed; former employees could not be found; it was
Supra Note 1.
INichols v. Webb, 8 Wheat. 432 (1832) ; Welsh v. Barrett, 15 Mass. 380
(1819).
'Payne v. Hodge, 7 Hun 612 (1876).
" 102 N. Y. 572, 7 N. E. 905 (1886).
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
difficult to ascertain by whom an entry was made; these and the con-
sideration that the production of scores of employees to attend court
deranged the work of the establishment and extended the litigation
interminably, indicated that the need for reform was imperative.
How imperative was this need may be gathered from the fact that
the identical problem was considered by the Legal Research Commit-
tee operating under the Commonwealth Fund of 1920.11 This com-
mittee, composed of leading authorities on the law of evidence, includ-
ing such men as Chief Judge Cardozo, Dean Pound, Mr. Justice
Stone, and Professor Wigmore, was requested to consider the whole
subject of the law of evidence and to propose specific reforms. As-
sistants were employed to compile factual material with regard to the
actual status of the law and rules of evidence in the various states,
and to collect the opinions of those who had had actual experi-
ence with the working of the law of evidence in their respective
jurisdictions.
Based on these investigations, which extended over a period of
nearly five years, the committee rendered a report of prevailing condi-
tions under the book entry rule, which is, in part, as follows: 12
"The extent and complexity of modern business and con-
temporary methods of bookkeeping render necessary a re-
examination of the rules of evidence governing the admissi-
bility of books of account and entries in the course of business.
The adjudicated cases alone, without any independent investi-
gation into current systems of accounting, reveal the need of
inducing the courts to give evidential credit to the books upon
which the mercantile and industrial world relies in the conduct
of business. * * *
"The law, then, if properly presented and understood, fur-
nishes a method by which most business accounts can be
proved; by a slight extension all could be proved. But at
what an exorbitant cost! Examine the following description
of the business system of handling a mixed order furnished
by one of the leading manufacturers of linoleum; and then
imagine the expense of proving the sale and delivery of goods
at an agreed price to a customer who puts in issue every ma-
terial allegation of the complaint."
Here follows the history of a transaction that might be dupli-
cated in a thousand instances in the normal procedure of everyday
business,-originating with the salesman on the road, passing to the
branch office, then to the sales, credit, order, shipping, billing and
bookkeeping departments.
n' The Law of Evidence-Some Proposals for Its Reform (1927).
Ibid., Ch. 5: Proof of Business Transactions to Harmonize with Current
Business Practice.
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Correspondence with a large number of prominent manufac-
turers and wholesalers revealed that (1) the number of operations
required to complete a transaction and the record of it varied from
two or three to twenty-six and involved from two to one hundred and
two persons. (2) It was frequently impossible later to identify the
person who performed any particular part of the transaction. (3) The
maker of the final entry usually had no personal knowledge of the
transaction recorded. (4) Where mechanical bookkeeping systems
were used, it was usually impossible to tell which member of the book-
keeping staff made any entry. A statute was suggested to remedy
this situation, and was adopted as Section 374a of the Civil Practice
Act.
It will thus be seen that it was not the purpose of this section
to remove the effect of the hearsay rule in all instances of entries made
in the regular course of any business, but to make an exception in
the case of entries which are a part of commercial procedure, which
because of their nature, possess an element of trustworthiness which
justifies a rule which will "make the courts practical." Regarding
this element of trustworthiness, it is interesting to note a discussion
by Professor Wigmore: 13
"* * * The situation is one where, even though a desire
to state falsely may casually have subsisted, more powerful
motives to accuracy overpower and supplant it. In the typical
case of entries made systematically and habitually for the re-
cording of a course of business dealings, experience of human
nature indicates three distinct though related motives which
operate to secure in the long run a sufficient degree of probable
trustworthiness and make the statements fairly trustworthy:
1. The habit and system of making such a record with
regularity calls for accuracy through the interest and purpose
of the entrant; and the influence of habit may be relied on, by
very inertia, to prevent casual inaccuracies and to counteract
the possible temptation to misstatements. 14
2. * * * misstatements cannot safely be made, if at
all, except by a systematic and comprehensive plan of falsi-
fication. * * *
3. If in addition to this the entrant makes the record
under a duty to an employer or other superior, there is the
additional risk of censure and disgrace from the superior, in
case of inaccuracies, a motive on the whole the most powerful
and most palpable of the three. * * * "
If the proper regard be had for the distinction between hearsay
in the regular course of business, in which case the record is based
on information received from one in the regular course of his busi-
" 3 Wigmore, Evidence (1923), Sec. 1522.
" Poole v. Vicas, 1 Bing. N. C. 649 (1835).
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ness, and pure hearsay, in which case the record is based on informa-
tion received from one disconnected from the business, it is obvious
that the decision in Johnson v. Lutz 15 represents an interpreta-
tion warranted by the terms of the statute and the underlying
theory of circumstantial trustworthiness. It is submitted that, by
limiting the provision that "the lack of personal knowledge by entrant
or maker will not affect admissibility," with the requirement that "the
entry must be made by one in the regular course of his business," the
Court has in effect decreed that personal knowledge must exist at the
source of the transaction by one in the regular course of his business,
regardless of hearsay in the regular course of business at any other
stage.1'
While such a requirement will apply as well to a complicated
system of entries, it is more obvious, due to the simplified -procedure,
in the case of a casual entry represented by a police blotter. Practi-
cally applied, it will simply be necessary to show the usual custom
by which an entry was received, without producing the vaious per-
sons who contributed to the making of it; and then, in order to show
that it was not received in the regular course of business, it will be
necessary for the objecting party to prove that the entry sought to be
admitted was founded on pure hearsay, as distinguished from hearsay
in the regular course of business.
DOROTHY SLAYTON.
THE VALIDITY OF A MORTGAGE CREATED AS A GIFT.
I
"There is perhaps no species of ownership known to law which
is more complex or which has given rise to more diversity of opinions
and even conflict in decisions than which sprung from the mortgage
of Real Property." 1 Thus when we consider our problem, which
involves but one phase of a single planet in the great universe of
mortgage law, it becomes less strange, more feasible and even to be
expected that it too should have become part of the chaos. Our in-
quiry is: Can one create a mortgage by way of gift in New York
today? The aspect we shall consider is the situation as between the
mortgagor and mortgagee. Enlightenment will best be attained by
tracing the history of the mortgage instrument, which in itself has
' Supra Note 2.
See opinion by Mr. Justice Byrne in Kane v. City of New York (Spec.
Tr. Kings Co., N. Y. L. J., April 4, 1930).
'Barrett v. Hinkly, 124 Ill. 32, 14 N. E. 863 (1883).
